Native to central Texas, Juniperus ashei has rapidly expanded and increased in abundance over the past century. Two ecosystem services are negatively affected by this juniper encroachment: water and biodiversity provision. Ranchers also are directly affected by the loss of forage capacity. In response, a federal agency sought to create a cost-share compensation program designed to encourage rangeland restoration that increases the provision of water and wildlife. Our research examined a hypothetical brush clearing program to maintain and restore habitat for two endangered songbirds.
Using data from structured interviews and surveys (N = 258), we used a latent class choice model to examine the combinations of incentives needed to engender cooperation and the trade-offs landowners may be willing to make when choosing to participate. We examined landowner preferences for financial incentives, technical assistance, contract length, and assurances against future land regulation. We also included two expected outcomes related to land and species improvement. To explain landowner preferences, we included measures of attitude and subjective norm from the theory of reasoned action.
Results/Conclusions
Our model fit well (ρ2 = 0.41) and we identified three landowner subgroups. Landowners in group 1 (44% of the sample) had positive attitudes but felt negative social pressure. This group was likely to opt out and not choose a contract. Group 2 (25%) had positive attitudes and felt positive social pressure to enroll. They were likely to choose a contract over no contract in the choice task. Group 3 (31% of the sample) consisted of those who refused to indicate their preferences in the choice task. This group had both negative attitudes and felt social pressure not to enroll in the program. Groups 1 and 2 preferred similar amounts of cost share, incentive payments, and technical assistance. Group 1 preferred shorter contract lengths and strongly preferred complete assurance against future regulation. Only group 2 was concerned with species and land improvement as a result of enrolling.
Because most endangered species rely on private land, provision of biodiversity is contingent on landowners providing a public good. Compensation programs can rearrange incentive structures so that landowners choose to cooperate with endangered species recovery. This research can assist program designers by helping them recognize that landowners have heterogeneous preferences and consider factors beyond the financial incentives.
