Environmental values and assisted colonization: A reply to Sandler

Background/Question/Methods

One approach to the prevention of species and population loss due to rapid climate change is a strategy known as assisted colonization (AC), or managed relocation. The proposal involves facilitating migration and/or dispersal of species ahead of projected losses. The critical scientific considerations involved with risk/benefit analyses of AC are important and complicated.  What would be the impact to recipient ecosystems?  Would introducing species threaten existing biodiversity in recipient ecosystems? (Minteer and Collins, 2010) These and other considerations are crucial to evaluating the feasibility and scientific soundness of AC, but the question is not only whether AC is feasible and scientifically sound. We must also ask whether AC as an undertaking is right.  Ronald Sandler (2009) addresses this question in terms of environmental values, asking whether AC can preserve the value of species. He concludes that AC is “not an effective or well-justified approach to preserving the value of species,” and so it “ought to have, at most, a very minor role in the portfolio of ecosystem management practices.” I analyze Sandler’s arguments and consider whether AC can, indeed, be justified in terms of any environmental values.

Results/Conclusions

I agree with Sandler that no environmental value, taken singly, can ground the effectiveness of AC in preserving the value of species. However, I show that Sandler’s approach: 1) is inadequate to establish the conclusion for which he argues; and, 2) is at the same time too strong, entailing several peculiar conclusions. I offer a number of considerations regarding environmental values not addressed by Sandler. First, Sandler considers several types of environmental values that could ground the effectiveness of AC, but takes them singly. However, environmental values are rarely held monolithically. Second, no environmental values exist in isolation from other, non-environmental values. Considerations of justice, aesthetics, personal or cultural identity, and so forth deeply inform and color our environmental values. Third, values are highly contingent, shifting over time and with regard to the situation in question. Finally, values are shaped and modified through shared commitments, agreements, negotiations, and compromise. I conclude with an analysis that shows, even considered more broadly than Sandler’s treatment, no environmental values can adequately justify AC.