Increasing participation in incentive programs for biodiversity conservation

Background/Question/Methods

Engaging private landowners in conservation activities for imperiled species is critical to maintaining and enhancing biodiversity. Market-based approaches can incentivize conservation behaviors on private lands by shifting the benefit-cost ratio of engaging in activities that result in net conservation benefits for target species. In the United States and elsewhere, voluntary conservation agreements with financial incentives are becoming an increasingly common strategy. While the influence of program design and delivery of voluntary conservation programs is often overlooked, these aspects are critical in achieving the necessary participation to attain landscape-scale outcomes. To enhance understanding of how the program itself may influence participation, we examined private landowner preferences for participation in a conservation program to protect an at-risk species, the gopher tortoise (Gopherus polyphemus).

We focused on family forest landowners in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, who respectively account for 65%, 58%, and 30% of the forestlands in the three states. Using a mail survey, we sampled 1,051 landowners who resided in counties with known gopher tortoise populations. Each landowner was given a brief description of the gopher tortoise and the proposed program that included a voluntary conservation agreement. They were asked to choose between a series of hypothetical conservation programs that varied by program structure (e.g., contract length), delivery (e.g., decision-making authority), and perceived efficacy.

Results/Conclusions

Landowners were most sensitive to programs that are highly controlling, require permanent conservation easements, and put landowners at risk for future regulation. Programs designed with greater levels of compensation and that support landowners’ autonomy to make land management decisions can increase participation and increase landowner acceptance of program components that are generally unfavorable. There is an inherent trade-off between maximizing participation and maximizing the conservation benefits when designing a conservation incentive program. For conservation programs targeting private lands to achieve landscape-level benefits, they must attract a critical level of participation that creates a connected mosaic of conservation benefits. Yet, programs with attributes that strive to maximize conservation benefits within a single agreement (and reduce risks of failure) are likely to have low participation, and thus low landscape benefits. Achieving levels of landowner participation in conservation agreement programs that deliver lasting, landscape-level benefits requires careful attention not only to how the program structure influences potential conservation benefits, but also how it influences landowners and their potential to participate.